Trackers / Export controls
China AI Chip and Export-Control Tracker (2022–2026)
A maintained, sourced record of US export controls on AI chips and how China is responding: domestic accelerators, memory, manufacturing, model efficiency, and power.
Last updated: 6 July 2026 · Maintained by China AI Dispatch · Built from 100-plus fact-checked daily issues
The United States has spent three years trying to deny China the chips that train and run frontier AI. China's answer has not been one thing. It has been a domestic chip industry led by Huawei, a memory industry led by CXMT and YMTC, a set of workarounds at the manufacturing edge, an aggressive bet on model efficiency, and a large lead in electricity. This page tracks both sides of that contest, with dates and sources.
We scan more than 100 Chinese-language sources every day and publish what matters for an English-speaking audience. This tracker distills the chip and export-control thread of that reporting into one reference. It is not a triumphal story. China still trails at the leading edge of manufacturing, and high-bandwidth memory is a real dependency. Where the picture is disputed, we say so.
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What is the state of play in mid-2026?
Five things are true at once in the middle of 2026. Read together, they explain why the export-control debate no longer has a simple answer.
1. Nvidia has largely lost the China AI market. The H20, Nvidia's main China-legal AI chip, was halted in April 2025, forcing a 4.5 billion dollar write-off. The H200 was cleared for China in January 2026 but has effectively not sold, after Beijing discouraged purchases and Washington attached a condition routing a quarter of revenue to the US government. In May 2026, Nvidia chief executive Jensen Huang said the company had "largely conceded" the market to Huawei.
2. Domestic accelerators are filling the gap, unevenly. Huawei shipped roughly 812,000 Ascend cards in 2025 (IDC) and leads. Cambricon, Moore Threads, Alibaba's T-Head, Baidu's Kunlunxin, Biren, MetaX, Enflame and Iluvatar CoreX are all in production or heading to public markets. By the Stanford AI Index, domestic chips reached about 41 percent of China's AI-server market in 2025, up from roughly 5 percent two years earlier. The precise split is disputed. The direction is not.
3. The manufacturing ceiling still holds. This is the honest caveat. SMIC's most advanced line can make only about 2.6 million AI chips this year against domestic demand near 4.2 million, a 40 percent gap, and its data-center chip revenue has been roughly flat for three years. Controls on chipmaking equipment, not on finished chips, are the constraint that has actually bitten. High-bandwidth memory is the other gap: CXMT's HBM slipped to 2027, and the three foreign makers still control almost all HBM supply, sold out through 2028.
4. So China is hedging with software. When hardware is capped, efficiency becomes the lever. DeepSeek's V4 runs on roughly 27 percent of the previous generation's compute per token at long (1-million-token) context and launched with Huawei Ascend as a primary deployment path. Its API sits far below Western frontier models. Xiaomi, Ant and MiniMax have all shown large gains in token efficiency. As one new DeepSeek hire put it, "when hardware is constrained, algorithm innovation becomes the way to break the compute bottleneck."
5. Power is China's structural edge. A model needs electricity as much as silicon. China generated 10,161 terawatt-hours in 2024 against the United States' 4,393, and in 2025 added far more new capacity. In late June 2026 China switched on an AI data center running entirely on a dedicated 500-megawatt wind-and-solar supply, days before a US emergency order let a grid operator pull data centers offline on 15 minutes' notice during a heat wave.
Timeline: US controls and China's response
The dated record. Entries from March 2026 onward link to the China AI Dispatch issue that reported them. The 2022 to 2025 background is the widely documented backdrop; our own fact-checked record begins in March 2026.
The US Commerce Department bars sales of the most advanced AI chips (the Nvidia A100 and H100 class) and key chipmaking equipment to China, the foundation every later rule builds on.
Nvidia designs throttled China parts (A800, H800), which are then restricted; the H20 becomes the main China-legal AI chip in 2024, then is halted in April 2025, forcing a 4.5 billion dollar write-off, one of the largest write-downs in semiconductor history.
Huawei's new accelerator claims 2.87 times the single-card compute of Nvidia's H20, is the only chip in China supporting 4-bit float (FP4), and pairs with Huawei's own HiBL 1.0 high-bandwidth memory (112GB, 1.4 TB/s). The roadmap runs 950DT in Q4 2026, 960 in 2027, 970 in 2028.
The head of the National Data Administration says China now processes 140 trillion AI tokens a day, up roughly 1,000 times from early 2024, a measure of how much inference the domestic stack is already serving.
Reuters reports ByteDance and Alibaba plan to order the Ascend 950PR, with Huawei targeting 750,000 units in 2026. The breakthrough that matters is CUDA compatibility, which lets buyers move off Nvidia without rewriting everything.
Shenzhen activates China's first 10,000-card AI cluster built entirely on domestic Huawei Ascend 910C chips, rated at 11,000 petaflops, with roughly 92 percent of capacity pre-booked.
The US House Select Committee on China releases "Buy What It Can, Steal What It Must," documenting legal procurement, smuggling and distillation, and notes China remains the largest market for chipmaking equipment despite the controls.
China's national computing hub in Zhengzhou runs 60,000 accelerator chips made by Sugon, a supercomputer firm tied to the Chinese Academy of Sciences, with zero chips from Nvidia, AMD or any Western supplier.
DeepSeek open-sources V4 under MIT with Huawei Ascend 950 as a primary deployment path: 1.6 trillion parameters, a 1-million-token context, and coding benchmarks a hair behind the best Western models. It is the first case of a Chinese chip, model and deployment stack lining up in public with no US dependency.
China's NDRC blocks Meta's roughly 2 billion dollar acquisition of Manus, an agent startup with Chinese roots that had reincorporated in Singapore, ordering the deal unwound. State media call the structure "Singapore-washing." It is the first time China has blocked a foreign AI deal on these grounds.
China's Cyberspace Administration bars major domestic firms from purchasing Nvidia AI chips, citing a technical assessment that domestic parts now match the still-permitted Nvidia chips. The control now cuts both ways.
SMIC secures approval to acquire full ownership of its most strategic 12-inch fab (SMIC North) for 5.9 billion dollars, the largest domestic wafer-foundry deal in Chinese history. The state Big Fund takes SMIC shares as consideration.
The US clears H200 sales to 10 Chinese firms, capped at 75,000 chips each, with 25 percent of revenue routed to the US government. Beijing tells the approved buyers not to purchase, keeping investment focused on domestic chips. Deliveries stay at zero.
On Nvidia's earnings call, Jensen Huang says China revenue is essentially zero: "We've really largely conceded that market to them," meaning Huawei. Data-center revenue elsewhere is up 92 percent.
CXMT, China's main DRAM maker, reports a first-quarter net profit of 24.76 billion yuan, more than its 2023 and 2024 losses combined, as AI-server demand sends DRAM contract prices up 93 to 98 percent in a quarter.
At a Shanghai conference, Huawei presents a "Tau Scaling Law": a transistor-stacking method (Logic Folding) that lifted Kirin transistor density 55 percent with no change of process node, backed by data from 381 production chips. The stated target is 1.4-nanometer-equivalent density by 2031 without ASML's extreme-ultraviolet tools.
A research team completes what it says is the first third-party full-parameter post-training of DeepSeek V4-Pro (1.6 trillion parameters) on about 1,000 Huawei Ascend 910C cards, with no instability. The caveat is efficiency: 34.9 percent hardware utilization versus 50 to 55 percent on Nvidia, a real but shrinking penalty.
US Commerce orders a leading US AI lab to cut its two highest-capability models off from all foreign nationals worldwide, an unprecedented extension of export controls from hardware to model access. The order is reversed on 19 June. It shows the frontier of the control effort moving beyond chips.
DeepSeek closes its first outside round, about 50 billion yuan (roughly 7.4 billion dollars) at a valuation of 52 to 59 billion dollars, the largest single AI raise in Chinese history. Founder Liang Wenfeng writes the biggest check; the only investor with a vote is the state-backed National AI Industry Investment Fund.
A SemiAnalysis teardown finds part of DeepSeek V4's architecture was co-designed for Huawei Ascend inference. The 950DT carries Huawei's own HiZQ memory, 144GB at 4 TB/s. Reuters reports ByteDance booked half the Ascend 950 line.
ByteDance is finalizing a deal for at least 50,000 inference chips from Iluvatar CoreX, a Shanghai startup, which would become its third domestic GPU supplier behind Huawei and Cambricon.
A Chinese system called LineShine tops the global TOP500 at 2.198 exaflops using about 47,000 domestic CPUs and zero GPUs, the first machine anywhere past 2 exaflops. The asterisk is the export-control story in one line: on the AI-relevant mixed-precision benchmark it came fourth, because GPU machines get a far larger speedup there.
An interagency committee had already cleared CXMT to be added to the US Entity List, but Commerce has not updated the list since October 2025, the longest pause in a decade, because the US and China are mid-negotiation. Apple is lobbying to keep CXMT off it so it can buy the memory.
Cambricon becomes China's first pure-play AI chip designer worth more than 1 trillion yuan. The same report frames the distance left to travel: of roughly 4 million AI accelerator cards China bought in 2025, Cambricon shipped about 116,000, a 2.9 percent share, against Nvidia's 55 percent.
CXMT signs a 20 billion yuan (2.94 billion dollar) long-term DRAM supply deal with Tencent, one of the largest domestic chip-procurement commitments in years, ahead of CXMT's planned Shanghai listing.
China switches on its first AI data center running entirely on green power, a dedicated 500-megawatt wind-and-solar supply wired straight into the servers in Ningxia. The same window, a US emergency order lets the PJM grid operator pull data centers onto backup generators on 15 minutes' notice during a record heat wave.
SMIC's advanced N+2 line, the only one in China making leading-edge AI chips at scale, targets about 2.6 million chips this year against domestic demand near 4.2 million. Huawei has locked 43 percent of that capacity on a five-year contract. This is the ceiling controls still impose.
The Information reports a US frontier lab found a way to cut inference costs by more than half and kept it in-house, even as DeepSeek's open V4 runs within a few points of the best Western coding models at a fraction of the price. The competition is shifting from who has the most chips to who wastes the fewest.
New entries land here first in the daily
This timeline is updated from the newsletter, so the daily is always a week or two ahead of the page. If you want the chip and export-control story as it breaks, that is where it is.
Which AI chips is China making at home?
The data-center accelerators that matter most for the export-control story. Automotive and edge silicon (BYD's Xuanji, Li Auto's Mach M100, Xpeng's Turing) is advancing on a separate track and is not listed here.
| Chip / line | Maker | What it is | Notable |
|---|---|---|---|
| Ascend 950PR | Huawei | Training and inference accelerator | Claims 2.87x Nvidia H20 single-card; first China chip with FP4; own HBM. ~812k Ascend cards shipped in 2025 (IDC). |
| Ascend 950DT | Huawei | Inference accelerator | 144GB in-house HiZQ memory at 4 TB/s; DeepSeek V4 partly co-designed for it. Series codenamed "David." |
| AI accelerators | Cambricon | AI accelerator | First pure-play AI chip designer past 1 trillion yuan market cap; ~116k cards shipped in 2025 (2.9% share). |
| MTT S5000 | Moore Threads | General-purpose GPU | Trained a 27B coding model end-to-end on its own cluster; GPU backend merged into the mainline SGLang framework. |
| T-Head M890 (Zhenwu) | Alibaba (PingTouGe) | AI accelerator | 144GB HBM, 128-chip supernode; ~560k T-Head chips shipped. Alibaba's own 10,000-chip data center runs on earlier Zhenwu-line chips. |
| Kunlunxin | Baidu | AI accelerator | Being spun off for a Hong Kong listing at a target near 50 billion dollars; Tencent is a customer. |
| CoreX (Tianshu Zhixin) | Iluvatar | Inference GPU | ByteDance finalizing a 50,000-chip order; positioned as a leading second-tier domestic supplier. |
| Enflame | Enflame (Tencent-backed) | AI accelerator | Cleared a STAR Market IPO targeting about 6 billion yuan; Tencent owns roughly 20 percent. |
| Biren, MetaX | Biren; MetaX | General-purpose GPUs | Biren in volume production; MetaX in production and on the domestic IPO track. |
| Sugon accelerators | Sugon (CAS-affiliated) | HPC / AI accelerator | 60,000 units run the Zhengzhou national computing hub with no Western chips. |
Scroll the table sideways to see every column.
US and allied export-control milestones
| Date | Action | Effect |
|---|---|---|
| Oct 2022 | US bans A100/H100-class chips and advanced chipmaking equipment to China | The foundational rule; Nvidia loses its top China parts |
| 2022 to 2024 | Throttled China parts (A800, H800) restricted; H20 becomes the China-legal chip | A cat-and-mouse cycle of chips designed to comply, then curbed |
| Apr 2025 | H20 export to China halted | 4.5 billion dollar Nvidia write-off; China revenue falls toward zero |
| Jan 2026 | H200 cleared for China sale | Sales stay near zero through mid-2026 |
| Apr 2026 | House Select Committee report on procurement and smuggling | Recommends four new export-control laws. Separately, the earlier MATCH Act targets ASML and Tokyo Electron equipment |
| 6 May 2026 | China bars domestic firms from buying Nvidia AI chips | A counter-control; Beijing keeps demand pointed at domestic parts |
| 14 May 2026 | US clears H200 to 10 firms with a 25%-of-revenue condition | Beijing tells them not to buy; deliveries stay at zero |
| Jun 2026 | US briefly cuts a lab's top AI models off from foreign nationals; reversed | Controls extend from hardware to model access, then retreat |
| Since Oct 2025 | Commerce Entity List unchanged, longest pause in a decade | CXMT kept off the list mid-negotiation; Apple lobbies to buy its memory |
Can China make its own memory?
Memory is where the contest is tightest. A global shortage has sent prices up sharply. China leads in one segment, is catching up in a second, and is still dependent in the third.
| Segment | Domestic leader | Status |
|---|---|---|
| Standard DRAM | CXMT | Q1 net profit 24.76 billion yuan; building toward 300,000 wafers a month; already ships DDR5 to Western brands under Samsung and Micron pricing. Cleared internally for the US Entity List, but not yet added. |
| 3D NAND flash | YMTC | Global share rose from 8 to 13 percent in a year (Counterpoint), now fourth worldwide; Q1 revenue up about 445 percent. The fastest-growing NAND maker. |
| High-bandwidth memory (HBM) | The gap | Huawei ships in-house HBM inside its Ascend chips, but CXMT's standalone HBM slipped to 2027. Samsung, SK Hynix and Micron still control almost all HBM supply, sold out through 2028. This is the clearest remaining dependency. |
Key players
Huawei is the center of the domestic effort: the Ascend accelerators, the CANN software stack that answers Nvidia's CUDA, and in-house HBM. SMIC is the foundry that makes the leading-edge chips, and the bottleneck, since it cannot yet build them at the volume demand requires. CXMT and YMTC are the memory champions (DRAM and NAND). DeepSeek is the model lab whose efficiency work turned a compute deficit into a smaller problem, now partly state-owned. Cambricon, Moore Threads, Alibaba's T-Head, Baidu's Kunlunxin, Biren, MetaX, Enflame and Iluvatar CoreX are the widening field of accelerator makers. Behind them sit state investment vehicles: the Big Fund (the National Integrated Circuit Industry Investment Fund), which backs the chipmakers, and the National AI Industry Investment Fund, which took the sole voting stake in DeepSeek's first outside round.
Common questions
Can China build advanced AI chips without Nvidia?
For a growing share of inference and some training, yes. Huawei's Ascend line leads, and models like DeepSeek V4, Zhipu GLM and Meituan LongCat have been trained or served on domestic clusters. But China still trails at the leading edge: SMIC's advanced line can make only about 2.6 million AI chips this year against domestic demand near 4.2 million, and high-bandwidth memory remains a dependency.
What is the Huawei Ascend 950?
Huawei's 2026 AI accelerator line, codenamed David. The 950PR, unveiled in March 2026, claims 2.87 times the single-card compute of Nvidia's China-market H20 and uses Huawei's own memory. The 950DT adds 144GB of in-house HiZQ memory for inference. IDC reported Huawei shipped about 812,000 Ascend cards in 2025.
Did US export controls on China work?
Partly. Controls on chipmaking equipment have held, and SMIC still cannot build leading-edge chips at volume. But controls on finished chips pushed Chinese buyers onto domestic parts faster. In May 2026 Nvidia's Jensen Huang said the company had largely conceded China's AI chip market to Huawei.
Can China make its own HBM memory?
Partially. Huawei ships in-house high-bandwidth memory inside its Ascend chips, and CXMT is developing HBM, but CXMT's HBM timeline slipped to 2027. The three foreign makers, Samsung, SK Hynix and Micron, still control almost all HBM supply and are sold out through 2028. HBM is the clearest remaining dependency in China's AI hardware stack.
Is DeepSeek affected by the chip ban?
DeepSeek adapted rather than stalled. Its V4 model, open-sourced in April 2026, launched with Huawei Ascend as a primary deployment path and leans on algorithmic efficiency, using roughly 27 percent of the previous generation's compute per token at long (1-million-token) context, to stretch limited high-end compute.
What is China's answer to the compute gap?
Three things at once: domestic chips (Huawei Ascend and a widening field of rivals), model efficiency (DeepSeek, Xiaomi, Ant and others improving token efficiency), and a large advantage in electricity, where China generates more than twice the United States and is adding capacity far faster.
What happened to the Nvidia H20 and H200 in China?
The H20 was halted for China in April 2025, forcing a 4.5 billion dollar Nvidia write-off. The H200 was cleared for China in January 2026 but has effectively not sold, after Beijing discouraged purchases and Washington attached a condition routing 25 percent of revenue to the US government.
Sources and method
Every dated entry from March 2026 onward traces to a China AI Dispatch issue, which in turn cites a named primary source (Reuters, the Financial Times, CCTV, company filings, technical reports, and Chinese trade press such as InfoQ, Caixin, tmtpost and 36Kr). We prefer facts that carry a hard date and a named source, and we flag what is disputed.
A few figures that circulate widely are deliberately hedged here. The often-quoted "40 percent domestic chip share" is well supported for the direction of travel but the precise split is contested. Self-reported milestones, such as a model vendor claiming an all-domestic training run, are labeled as claims until independently verified. Where two of our own issues disagreed on a number, we used the figure with the stronger primary source or omitted it.
This is a living document. It is updated from the daily newsletter, which means the newsletter always has the newest entries first.
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